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Market power issues in digital advertising have received large attention from public 
authorities. The competition authorities of France and UK each published a report on the 
digital advertising market (Autorité de la Concurrence 2018; CMA 2020) and  the Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission, after a Digital platform inquiry (ACCC 2019),  
published the interim report of its Digital advertising services inquiry in September  2020. 1 
There are two main formats of digital advertising: search advertising and display advertising. 
Search advertising consists of paid-for listings in search results, while display advertising 
includes rectangular ads that appear on websites visited through a browser. The display 
advertising can further be divided into open display advertising and display advertising from 
“owned-and-operated” platforms. In the open display advertising market, the vast majority of 
publishers (e.g. newspapers) sell their advertising inventory to a wide range of advertisers 
through a complex chain of third-party advertising intermediaries, also called “ad tech 
providers”. The open display advertising provides an alternative to the display advertising 
from ‘owned-and-operated’ platforms (e.g. Google, Facebook, Amazon), which sell their own 
advertising inventory (i.e. ad space on their own websites) through their own ad tech interface 
within their so-called “walled gardens”. On October 20, 2020, the US Department of Justice 
filed a lawsuit against Google for unlawfully maintaining monopoly in search and search 
advertising (US DoJ 2020). This report is about Google’s exclusionary and exploitative practices 
in the ad intermediation market for open display advertising. On December 16, 2020, ten 
states in the U.S. filed a lawsuit against Google’s monopolisation of online display advertising.2 
In open display advertising, to achieve the complicated task of selecting an ad to be served to 
an individual in real time and establishing the price to be paid for doing so, publishers and 
advertisers rely on a vertical chain of intermediaries. On the supply side, there are publisher 
ad servers and supply-side platforms (SSPs), which include ad exchanges. On the demand side, 
there are demand-side platforms (DSPs) and advertiser ad servers. Google is the leader at each 
                                                          
* Toulouse School of Economics, University of Toulouse Capitole. I would like to thank Francesco Decarolis, Alexandre de Cornière, Lucie 
Lechardoy, Yassine Lefouili, Francisco Lupiáñez, Jun Yan, the expert group of the observatory on online platform economy and the supporting 
team of the European Commission for helpful comments. 
1 https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/serial-publications/digital-platform-services-inquiry-2020-2025/digital-platform-services-inquiry-
september-2020-interim-report  
2 The content of the document filed by the ten states is largely consistent with this report. For instance, it states that in the U.S, Google has 
monopoly power in the publisher ad server market, in the display ad ex change market and in the ad buying tool market for small publishers. 
The document goes beyond this report in two respects. First, it provides new details, based on internal documents, about Google’s various 
anticompetitve conducts. Second, it provides details about the agreement made between Google and Facebook to neutralize competition 
from header bidding. See:   
 https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/sites/default/files/images/admin/2020/Press/20201216%20COMPLAINT_REDACTED.pdf . 
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layer of intermediation and its publisher ad server has more than 90 percent market share in 
the UK (CMA, 2020).  
Building on recent reports and studies on digital advertising (especially, the CMA report (2020), 
the Support study to the Observatory on the Online Platform Economy (2020)3 and Srinivasan 
(2020)) and insights from the economic literature on two-sided markets,4 the report aims at 
shedding light on various ways Google has built up and exploited its market power in the ad 
intermediation industry for open display advertising5. Even if the report focuses on Google 
and devotes little space to Facebook, its analysis also applies to Facebook as long as Facebook 
uses strategies similar to those used by Google. 6  As the report focuses on the main 
exclusionary and exploitative practices Google has employed, it does not aim at being 
exhaustive by covering all competition issues in the open display advertising market7 and does 
not provide any new empirical fact either. Providing remedies to fix the market power issue is 
also beyond the scope of this report although it provides some reflections on how to build a 
level-playing field in the ad intermediation market and on data practices which promote 
consumer surplus and publishers’ incentive to invest in content (see the last section). 
In addition to exclusionary and exploitative practices, the report covers transparency issues in 
the open display advertising market. The market is characterized by lack of transparency as 
publishers do not see what happens between advertisers and demand-side intermediaries (e.g. 
DSPs) whereas advertisers do not see what happens between publishers and supply-side 
intermediaries (e.g. publisher ad servers and SSPs). Opacity builds a barrier to entry by making 
it difficult for a stand-alone entrant intermediary to demonstrate the merits of its service, 
which may in turn incentivize Google to make the market less transparent.8 Opacity makes it 
difficult to detect exclusionary and exploitative practices. Opacity exacerbates Google’s 
conflicts interest, generated by its market power at each layer of ad intermediation. 
Market concentration and opacity in the ad intermediation for open display advertising 
translate into high fees for ad intermediation. This reduces publishers’ ad revenues and 
thereby their incentives to invest in content such as newspapers’ incentives to invest in 
investigative journalism. Consumers are harmed because publishers invest less in content and 
advertisers pass-through to consumers high advertising prices. 
The report shows that data and privacy are at the core of the competition issue in the ad 
intermediation market for open display advertising. If different ad intermediaries are vertically 
and horizontally interoperable and therefore advertisers can multi-home, there will be no 
                                                          
3 Lechardoy, L; Sokolyanskaya, A; Lupiáñez, F (2020). Transparency in the Business-to Business Commercial Relations in the Online 
Advertising Market. Observatory on the Online Platform Economy, 2020, Study on “Support to the Observatory for the Observatory for the 
Online Platform Economy”. 
4 See for instance Anderson and Coate (2005), Armstrong (2006), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006). 
5 The report, to some extent, complements the work of Scott Morton and Dinielli (2020). 
6 We focus on Google as Google’s market power in ad intermediation for open display advertising is much stronger than Facebook’s one 
even if Facebook holds a larger market share in display advertising inventory. 
7 For instance, Scott Morton and Dinielli (2020) expose 20 anticompetitive conducts of Google in the digital advertising market. 
8 Opacity can partially be a consequences of market power, where dominant players can use their economic power to impose their terms 
and leave advertisers and publishers in the dark regarding the costs, profits and effectiveness of placement of ads (Lechardoy et al, 2020). 
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entry barrier and no intermediary will have strong market power. However, the current ad 
intermediation market is characterized by lack of interoperability and single-homing of 
advertisers (and publishers). This is mainly caused by Google’s decision to hash its ad server 
user IDs, which is a process of scrambling characters based on a mathematical formula 
(Srinivasan, 2020). Google claims that it hashes IDs for consumer privacy protection. But 
Google’s hashing of user IDs for all rival intermediaries but for its own ones significantly 
reduces  interoperability and makes advertisers’ multihoming of DSPs difficult. This creates a 
tendency for market tipping by generating strong indirect network effects: single-homing 
advertisers tend to choose the demand-side intermediary which gives access to the largest 
number of publishers and reciprocally for single-homing advertisers.  
Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick, which was both a leading publisher ad server and a 
leading advertiser ad server, in 2007 was a major turning point in the open display advertising 
market. At that time, publishers retained ownership over data generated by DoubleClick and 
DoubleClick could not combine a publisher’s data with other data for ad targeting. At the time 
of the Google-DoubleClick merger, Google made a commitment not to combine data but 
reversed it later on. Nowadays, Google collects browsing data from almost all third-party 
publishers and combines it with data from Google-owned products in order to create super 
profiles of consumers for ad targeting. This combination of publishers’ data and Google’s 
vertical integration into consumer-facing products generate another kind of conflicts of 
interest based on ‘data leakage’, which means that a publisher’s unique audience may be 
‘commoditised’ and used to target ads on other sites (including Google’s sites). In fact, Google 
has strong incentives to show highly valuable advertisements on its own websites. The data 
leakage undermines publishers’ incentive to invest in content by reducing the value of ad 
inventory on publishers’ websites, which in turn harms consumers.  
The data leakage issues raises a deep and fundamental question: what is the socially optimal 
scope of data combination for targeted advertising both from a static point of view and a 
dynamic point of view? The scope of data combination preferred by consumers and publishers 
may diverge from the one preferred by advertisers and ad intermediaries: the latter would 
prefer the maximal scope of data combination whereas it is not obvious whether consumers 
and publishers would prefer it. First, from a dynamic point of view, as previously described, 
data leakage reduce publishers’ incentives to invest in content. Second, even if we neglect the 
investment incentive, the maximal data combination which allows Google to build super 
profiles of consumers may not be desirable as there are increasing concerns about platforms’ 
manipulations of consumer behaviors by exploiting consumers’ psychological vulnerabilities.9 
The report is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the vertical chain of ad intermediaries 
and Google’s current market shares. Section 3 describes the ad intermediation industry at the 
time of the Google-DoubleClick merger and shows that by a sharp contrast to the current 
situation, the industry was characterized by healthy competition, interoperability and 
                                                          
9 Calo (2014). The concern is larger for advertising-financed platforms such as Google and social media (Zuboff, 2019, and Rosenquist, Scott 
Morton and Weinstein, 2020) 
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multihoming. Section 4 provides a simple economics of the complex open display advertising 
market. Section 5 describes how Google built up its market power in the vertical chain of ad 
intermediation. Section 6 describes transparency issues. Section 7 describes how Google 
exploits its market power and lack of transparency. Section 8 concludes the report by 
presenting some reflections on ways to build a level-playing field and to promote consumer 
surplus and publishers’ incentive to invest in content. 
 
 
2 Ad intermediaries and Google’s market shares  
In this section, we describe the vertical chain of ad tech intermediaries and Google’s market 
share in each layer of the vertical chain.  
2.1 Ad intermediaries 
When digital advertising was in its infancy, publishers sold most of their inventory through 
direct deals with advertisers and media agencies (hired by advertisers), reflecting the way 
advertising was traditionally sold in the offline world. However, the volume of available 
impressions could not be perfectly estimated in an online context and therefore, publishers 
had to find a way to sell ‘remnant’ inventory, which had not been pre-sold through a direct 
deal. This provided a space for ad networks, which could buy remnant inventory from various 
publishers and repackage it before selling it to advertisers. The agreements between ad 
networks and publishers were based on pre-agreed prices.  
Over time, however, there was a realization that allowing advertisers to make their bids in real 
time based on information about the user to whom advertising will be shown could increase 
the efficiency of advertising. Hence, programmatic advertising emerged, which enables 
automatic buying and selling of ad inventory using audience data in real time. The 
programmatic advertising market has experienced a rapid growth in Europe, outpacing non-
programmatic advertising since 2016 and amounting to EUR 16.8 billion in 2018 (Lechardoy et 
al 2020, p.15). 
To achieve the complicated task of selecting an ad to be served to an individual in real time 
and establishing the price to be paid for doing so, advertisers and publishers rely on a vertical 
chain of intermediaries. On the supply side, there are publisher ad servers and supply side 
platforms (SSPs) and on the demand side, there are demand side platforms (DSPs) and 
advertiser ad servers. This chain of specialized intermediaries which perform various functions 
for both publishers and advertisers is known as the ‘ad tech stack’. In what follows, we 
describe the function of each intermediary in the ad tech stack. 
The Publisher Ad Server plays a central role in digital intermediation, as it is responsible for 
the decision logic that determines the choice of which ad will appear at each specific piece of 
inventory. This does not simply involve selecting the highest bid but requires a holistic 
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management of real-time demand and the direct deals agreed by the publisher with 
advertisers and media agencies.  
Publishers typically single-home on one ad server. Furthermore, switching cost is very high: 
“switching ad server is a complex and lengthy process which takes several months to complete 
and involves significant risks of revenue loss.” (The CMA report 2020, p. 270).  
The complexity of the operations carried out by publisher ad servers gives them a degree of 
autonomy from publishers. For example, Google’s ad server has been able to impose changes 
to the rules publishers must follow in selling their own advertising (The CMA report, Appendix 
M 2020, p.M29). 
Supply Side Platforms (SSP) provide the technology to automate the sale of digital inventory. 
They allow real-time auctions by connecting to multiple DSPs, collecting bids from them, 
determining the winning bidder and sending a bid back to the publishers. They also determine 
which buyers can bid and which data to disclose to buyers. SSPs initially tended to be separate 
from ad exchanges, marketplaces connecting buyers and sellers and hosting real-time 
auctions. The two roles (SSPs and ad exchanges) have to a large extent merged in recent years 
to the point that the two terms are used interchangeably.  
When an SSP and a DSP are operated by different providers, a process of cookie matching, 
called cookie syncing, is required in order for the DSP to identify the relevant consumer 
information to associate to a given impression. An SSP needs to be sufficiently large to attract 
DSPs because cookie matching success is determined by the SSP’s scale, i.e., its exposure to 
other impressions from the same user.  
Demand Side Platforms (DSP) are services that enable advertisers and media agencies to buy 
advertising space from multiple SSPs. DSPs enable advertisers to store their ads, use 
algorithms to process user data and identify matches with the advertisers’ audience, assess 
the value of each impression and optimize bid prices to help them buy the best matched ad 
slots.  
One of the main roles of DSPs is to provide advertisers with the ability to target users in real 
time. DSPs can provide access to their own proprietary data and allow advertisers to use data 
through integrations with Data Management Platforms (DMPs).  
Advertisers typically single-home on one DSP for a given campaign while large advertisers 
often use multiple DSPs across advertising campaigns.  
Advertiser Ad Servers are used by advertisers and media agencies to store the ads, deliver 
them to publishers, keep track of this activity and assess the impact of their campaigns by 
tracking conversions.  
The next figure describes a simplified ad tech stack. As advertiser ad servers play a less 
important role than the other intermediaries, in our analysis, we will focus on publisher ad 
servers, SSPs and DSPs. However, note that Google Ads, which are used by most small 
8 
 
publishers for search advertising, perform both the function of an advertiser ad server and a 
DSP. 
 
Figure 1. A simplified ad tech stack (Source: CMA, 2020) 
A typical process of selling advertising inventory works in the following way. When a user 
opens a webpage (or uses an app), the publisher’s ad server sends a bid request to SSPs for 
the advertising space available on the web page. In turn, the SSPs send bid requests to multiple 
DSPs. DSPs evaluate the advertising opportunity based on the objectives of the campaigns of 
their advertisers and send bids to the SSPs. SSPs then rank the bids received based on price 
and on priority levels that may have been set by the publisher and send their winning bids to 
the publisher. Finally, the publisher ad server compares bids received from SSPs, together with 
any pre-existing direct deals between the publisher and specific advertisers, and decides 
which ad to serve on the webpage.  
For later analysis, we here emphasize the lack of data interoperability, which is generated by 
the fact that each intermediary uses a different cookie ID. First, if a DSP and a SSP are operated 
by different providers, a process of cookie matching is required. This process is prone to failure 
and can result in approximately 30% failed matching. Second, a main cost of using multiple 
DSPs comes from the lack of common ID between different technologies, which makes it 
difficult to manage frequency, which refers to the number of times a user is shown an 
advertising over a period of time. For instance, the ID Google’s SSP shares with its own DSP is 
different from the ID it shares with a rival DSP. Therefore, an advertiser using both DSPs may 
fail to know that the two different IDs are associated with the same user and hence end up 
bidding twice for the same user through different DSPs. 
2.2 Google’s acquisitions and market shares in ad intermediation 
Google made a number of acquisitions in ad tech industry. Google’s most significant 
acquisitions in ad tech include:  
• DoubleClick (April 2007) – Publisher ad server and ad exchange; formed the basis of 
Google’s ad server and AdX (now Google Ad Manager).  
• AdMob (November 2009) – Technology for serving ads on apps; formed the basis of 
Google’s AdMob product.  
• Invite Media (June 2010) – Media buying optimization technology for the display 
advertising market; evolved into Google’s main DSP product, Google DV360.  
• AdMeld (June 2011) – Supply Side Platform; integrated into Google AdX.  
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• Adometry (May 2014) – Analytics and attribution provider; integrated into Google 
Analytics to provide improved attribution services.  
For later analysis, we also note that Google acquired YouTube in November 2006.  
Because of the above acquisitions and Google’s leverage of data, advertising inventories and 
speed advantage, Google is currently the dominant player at each vertical layer of the ad tech 
stack. We below report Google’s market shares in the UK provided by the CMA (2020). The 
publisher ad server market is monopolized by Google as Google Ad Manager accounts for 
more than 90% of the display ads served in the UK. Google has 50-60% share in the SSP market 
in the UK. Google’s DSP DV360 has a 30-40 % market share. Google operates a DSP through 
Google Ads, which has a 10-20 % market share. Hence, the combined market share in DSP 
becomes 40-60% in the UK. The advertiser ad server market is highly concentrated and Google 
accounts for approximately 80-90 % of the ads served to UK users.  
The next figure summarizes Google’s marker shares in the ad tech stack. 
 
Figure 2: Google’s role in advertising intermediation (Source: CMA, 2020) 
We end this section by describing what is called “ad tech take”, which represents the 
difference between what advertisers pay and what publishers earn from digital advertising. 
According to the estimation of the CMA (2020), on average in 2019, publishers received at 
best 65% of initial advertising revenue that was paid by advertisers (i.e. the overall ‘ad tech 
take’ was at least 35%). The CMA also found that, in transactions where both Google Ads and 











3 The ad intermediation industry  
at the time of the Google-DoubleClick merger  
Even if the ad intermediation market is highly concentrated these days, it was far from the 
case at the time when Google acquired DoubleClick in 2007. At that time, the ad 
intermediation market was characterized by healthy competition, multihoming and 
interoperability. In particular, the data practices were so different from those of nowadays: 
publishers and advertisers retained ownership of their data collected by DoubleClick. We 
below briefly describe how the display ad intermediation market worked at that time, what 
was the standard data practices and what was the main concern regarding the merger. 
At the time of the merger, in non-search advertising, Google's market share was limited and 
in particular was zero in display ad because Google offered only intermediated sales through 
its AdSense network and these intermediated sales concerned almost exclusively contextual 
ads and no display ads (EC 2008, p. 30). DoubleClick was the leading provider of display ad 
serving technology for publishers and advertisers. On the publisher side, it was the leader in 
Europe with 40-50 % market share and on the advertiser side, each of DoubleClick and 
aQuantive/Atlas (acquired by Microsoft as a reaction to Google’s acquisition of DoubleClick) 
had 35% market share in Europe (EC 2008, p.35). Note that targeting advertising based on 
web browsing data (called, behavioural targeting) was an emerging technology, which neither 
DoubleClick nor Google yet developed, unlike a number of competing firms. 
Regarding the competitive situation in the ad serving market, the EC found that DoubleClick 
faced strong competition from a number of rivals and thus would not be able to exercise any 
significant market power (EC 2008, p. 77). Regarding the concern about leveraging 
DoubleClick’s leading position in ad serving to the market for ad intermediation, the EC found 
evidence that there was significant entry and competition in online ad intermediation as well 
as evidence on the prevalence of multihoming and the ability of ad networks to compete even 
with a relatively small number of partners on the publisher side (EC 2008, p. 80). The 
prevalence of multihoming suggests that the participation by a publisher or an advertiser to 
an ad network does not imply that they are unable or unwilling to participate in another ad 
network. The median number of ad network participation by European publishers was 2 (while 
it was 5 in the United States). The multihoming is also enabled by the interoperability of the 
ad serving technology allowing publishers and advertisers to provide instructions across 
several networks. As a consequence of multihoming and interoperability, many ad networks 
and ad exchanges developed in parallel and were growing.  
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A major concern regarding the merger was about combining Google’s search data with 
DoubleClick’s browsing data to enable highly targeted advertising and eventually to tip both 
the search ad and the display ad markets. For instance, according to the dissenting FTC 
commissioner Pamela Jones Harbour, who was prophetic in predicting the outcomes of the 
merger, combining both companies’ vast troves of data about search and browsing enables 
highly targeted advertising and exacerbates network effects such that, “the 
Google/DoubleClick combination is likely to “tip” both the search and display markets in 
Google’s favor, and make it more difficult for any other company to challenge the combined 
firm.” (FTC 2007, p.5). 
However, the EC found that DoubleClick was contractually prohibited from using the data of 
individual publishers or advertisers to improve targeting for other publishers or advertisers 
and that there was no indication that the merged entity would be able to impose contractual 
changes on its customers to allow such ‘cross-use’ of their data in the future. For instance, 
regarding the data generated by DoubleClick’s publisher ad server, EC wrote “This data 
contractually belongs to the publisher whose website it relates to. Presently, DoubleClick is 
limited in the use it can make of this data. In particular, it cannot be made available to other 
publishers or advertisers or be used to improve ad targeting for other publishers or advertisers.” 
(EC 2008, p.52) 
In a similar vein, Google’s chief legal officer assured the U.S. Congress that DoubleClick “data 
is owned by the customers, publishers and advertisers and DoubleClick or Google cannot do 
anything with it.” (U.S. Senate, 2007). Both the FTC and the EC approved the merger without 
imposing any condition. However, the concerns raised by the dissenting commissioner 
















4 Economics of the open display advertising market 
This section provides a simple economics of the complex open display advertising market10 
and thereby offers an economic framework to understand Google’s exclusionary and 
exploitative practices presented in subsequent sections. 
Economists use the concept of competitive bottleneck (Armstrong, 2006; Armstrong and 
Wright, 2007) to describe the market of ad-financed publishers. For instance, in the open 
display advertising market, a large number of publishers compete to attract consumers to 
spend time on their websites/apps and monetize their attention by selling display advertising. 
At a given time, the only way for advertisers to reach a given consumer is to buy ad space from 
the website/app which the consumer is visiting at the time. In this sense, the website/app is 
a bottleneck of the consumer and exercises this bottleneck power vis-à-vis advertisers by 
selling the ad inventory typically through a real-time auction. However, publishers compete 
to capture consumer attention by investing in content. In other words, the theory of 
competitive bottleneck predicts that publishers extract large surplus from the advertiser side 
but dissipate an important part of the extracted surplus to attract consumers by investing in 
content. 
A key assumption in this theory of competitive bottleneck is multihoming of advertisers such 
that any publisher has access to a relatively large number of advertisers. This is consistent with 
a market of competitive and interoperable ad intermediaries. Then, advertisers would use 
multiple demand-side platforms (DSPs) and hence publishers would be able to reach many 
advertisers even if they single-home when choosing publisher ad servers. However, a main 
feature of the current ad intermediation market is lack of interoperability, in particular due to 
the lack of common consumer IDs. This induces advertisers to single-home when they choose 
DSPs. When both publishers and advertisers single-home among ad intermediaries which are 
not interoperable, indirect network effects play a major role such that publishers (respectively, 
advertisers) want to choose the supply-side ad intermediary (the demand side-intermediary) 
which allows them to access a larger number of advertisers (respectively, publishers). This in 
turn creates a tendency for market tipping as small intermediaries have difficulty to attract 
publishers and advertisers. 
In fact, Google leverages its data, inventory and speed advantage to its DSPs and heavily 
subsidizes its publisher ad server. Furthermore, Google uses self-preferencing to channel 
advertisers’ demand captured by its DSPs to its SSP and publisher ad server and to use the 
vast amount of ad inventory controlled by its publisher ad server to favour its SSP and its DSPs. 
As a result, Google’s vertically integrated ad stack is dominant at each layer of ad 
intermediation and is monopolist in the publisher ad server market (at least in the UK). In 
addition, the fragmented nature of ad intermediation generates double marginalization 
problems, inducing each in a pair of vertically adjacent intermediaries to charge too high a fee 
relative to the fees chosen by a vertically integrated one. The lack of competition and 
                                                          
10 Regarding economic analysis of search advertising, see Decarolis, Goldmanis and Penta (2020) and Decarolis and Rovigatti (2019). 
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fragmentation in the ad intermediation tend to increase ad tech take. This tendency is further 
amplified by the opacity of ad intermediation. High ad tech take  implies that a large chunk of 
advertisers’ expenditure is captured by ad intermediaries, which reduces publishers’ ad 
revenues and thereby their incentives to invest in content. 
Another implicit (but important) assumption in a standard theory of competitive bottleneck is 
that each publisher has a control over its data. For instance, if a consumer reads Le Monde’s 
article reviewing a new generation of smartphones, only Le Monde can make use of such 
information to show a targeted advertising to the consumer. As we have seen previously, this 
was the data practice at the time of the Google-DoubleClick merger. However, nowadays, 
Google collects browsing data from almost all third-party websites/applications and combines 
it with the data from Google-owned products to create super profiles of consumers for ad 
targeting. This data combination, together with Google’s vertical integration into consumer-
facing products, generates a conflict of interest based on data leakage. Data leakage means 
that a publisher’s unique audience may be ‘commoditised’ and used to target ads on other 
sites, which undermines the value of advertising inventory on the publisher’s own website.  If 
le Monde uses Google’s publisher ad server, then its data will be combined with other sources 
of data by Google for ad targeting at other websites. In the context of the above example, 
Google has an incentive to show an ad featuring a new iPhone to the consumer who read Le 
Monde’s review article when she/he visits a Google’s website or another third-party website 
since by doing so Google obtains at least the ad tech take. In fact, Google has a much stronger 
incentive to show highly valuable ads on Google-owned websites than on third-party websites 
since in the first case, Google receives 100% of what is paid by advertisers while it gets only 
its ad tech take in the second case.  
Consumers are harmed if publishers have lower incentives to invest in content due to high ad 
tech take or data leakage. Consumers are also harmed if advertisers pass through high ad tech 
take by raising the prices of their products. Consumers, publishers and advertisers should 
prefer lower ad tech take and in this sense their interests are aligned regarding ad tech take. 
By contrast, their interests may be in conflict regarding data leakage; advertisers should like 








5 How did Google build up its market power  
in the display ad intermediation industry? 
Historically, Google was late to enter the programmatic advertising market and, when it 
launched an exchange in the fall of 2009, it faced a lot of competition. The same was true 
about Google’s entry into DSPs: in 2009, Google owned Google Ads (then called AdWords), 
but Google had not yet launched a DSP and plenty of firms competed in that market segment. 
Despite “playing catch up”, by around 2013, Google’s exchange overtook the competition to 
become the largest trading venue for ad space globally. Shortly afterwards, Google’s DSP, 
DV360, also eclipsed the competition to become the most used in the market (Srinivasan, 
2020). How did Google build up its market power in the display ad intermediation industry? 
5.1 Reducing interoperability by hashing consumer IDs 
Google restricted, for consumer privacy reasons, how any party other than Google could 
access its ad server user IDs by hashing the IDs, which is a process of scrambling characters 
based on a mathematical formula. At the same time, Google permitted its own exchange and 
DSPs (Google Ads and DV360) to access them by default. In this way, Google broke the 
universal cookie model that was the norm (Srinivasan, 2020). 
This change to hashing user IDs for everyone other than Google reserved an information 
advantage for Google while reducing interoperability and making multihoming difficult.  
First, it reduces vertical interoperability at any adjacent layers in the chain of intermediaries 
(i.e., between a Google publisher ad server and non-Google SSPs and between a Google SSP 
and non-Google DSPs). For instance, Google’s exchange shares users’ DoubleClick IDs with the 
Google-owned DSPs but sends a different hashed ID to a non-Google DSP. This information 
asymmetry distorts competition. To identify users associated with ad space for sale on 
Google’s exchange, non-Google DSPs must go through cookie syncing between Google’s 
hashed IDs and new IDs they assigned, which is inherently inefficient. 
Second, it reduces horizontal interoperability between different DSPs and makes multihoming 
of DSPs by advertisers difficult. As a Google DSP and a non-Google DSP operate on different 
user IDs, implementing frequency caps (ensuring that the same user does not see the same 
ad too often) becomes very difficult when using multiple DSPs for a given campaign. 
Furthermore, Google shares different hashed IDs across different rival DSPs, further reducing 
interoperability among non-Google intermediaries. 
We have seen that most publishers single-home in terms of publisher ad server. This together 
with single-homing of advertisers at the DSP level and the lack of interoperability creates 
strong indirect network effects. Publishers tend to choose an ad server which provides them 
with large access to advertisers and advertisers tend to choose a DSP which provides them 
with large access to publishers. This creates a market dynamics for tipping toward Google’s 
vertically integrated ad tech stack.   
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5.2 Data combination 
At the time of the Google-DoubleClick merger, DoubleClick was contractually prohibited from 
combining a publisher’s data with data of other publishers to improve targeting. Google told 
the U.S. Congress that “Google cannot do anything with” the data as data ownership rested 
in publishers and advertisers. In addition, Google told the Congress that it would not combine 
the data collected on internet users via DoubleClick with the data collected throughout 
Google's ecosystem (US House of Representatives 2020, p.209).  
However, Google reversed its commitment as its market power grew. In 2012, Google 
amended additional terms and conditions to obtain permission to merge data from the 
DoubleClick buyside and sell-side division with data from other Google business divisions, 
including Google’s exchange division and Google’s proprietary divisions Search and YouTube. 
In 2016, Google amended its consumer privacy policies again, this time obtaining permission 
to combine DoubleClick data with data Google separately has about consumers’ identity 
(Srinivasan 2020, p.61).  
Although Google CEO defended the reversal in its commitment by claiming “Today [we] make 
it easy for users to be in control of their data” (US House of Representatives 2020, p.210), 
Google’s increasing degree of data combination reflects its increasing market power, as is 
stated by Representative Val Demings at the Antitrust Subcommittee's sixth hearing in 2020: 
“So, in 2007, Google's founders feared making this change because they knew it would upset 
their users, but in 2016, Google didn't seem to care. Mr. Pichai (the Google CEO), isn't it true 
that what changed between 2007 and 2016 is that Google gained enormous market power.” 
(US House of Representatives 2020, p.210). 
Google’s combination of publishers’ data with other data to generate super profiles of 
consumers creates the previously mentioned “data leakage” problem and can seriously 
undermine publishers’ incentive to invest in content. Publishers’ loss of data control got 
further magnified recently. At the beginning of May 2018, just weeks before the GDPR came 
into effect, Google released its updated online terms and conditions to cover changes to its 
advertising services. The terms describe Google as a co-controller of data and require 
publishers to get consent on its behalf, Google becoming de facto controller of the data with 
the ability to combine data collected on publishers’ websites with data collected across its 
own operated services. Publishers consider that these changes were made in a non-negotiable 
way and that they had no choice but to accept this update. (Appendix S of the CMA report 
2020, p. S8). In 2018 Google started obtaining access to users’ readership information on third-
party sites and apps directly from consumers’ use of the Chrome browser, circumventing 
entirely the need to negotiate for these rights with third parties (e.g., publishers and 
advertisers) (Srinivasan 2020, p.61).  
5.3 Leveraging data 
Advertisers highly value the ability to offer personalised advertising based on consumers’ 
individual data. According to the CMA (2020)’s study of data generated by Google’s 
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Randomised Controlled Trial (RCT) of display advertising, UK publishers earned around 70% 
less revenue overall when they were unable to sell inventory using personalised advertising 
(i.e. when cookies were not available) but competed against others who could.11 
Google has a massive amount of consumer data from various sources, which it combines to 
build detailed super profiles of individuals to make inferences about the types of products and 
services that they are likely to purchase. By making its data available only within its walled 
garden, Google leverages its data to its own ad intermediaries. In addition, hashing user IDs 
for everyone other than Google amplifies the power of this data leverage. The data leverage 
is strongly manifested at the DSP layer (DV360 and Google Ads) since the main function of a 
DSP is to enable ad targeting, which is facilitated by detailed profiling based on massive data. 
We below describe various sources of data for Google. 
• Google obtains the first-party data from its own consumer-facing services and Android 
mobile devices.  Google provides more than 53 consumer-facing services and products 
in the UK, including Google Search, and gathers data through them (Appendix F of the 
CMA report, 2020, p. F8). The data contains user information, information about 
device, apps and browser used, consumer activities and location. Search data is very 
valuable because it allows advertisers to target consumers who are actively looking for 
specific products and services. Google has a great advantage in relation to location 
data, which it gathers systematically from mobile devices running Android.  
• Google collects data directly from third-party websites and apps by providing them 
with analytics tools such as Google Analytics, advertising services such as Google 
AdSense. Google tags (eg Google Analytics, Google Ads and Floodlight tags) are found 
on over 80% of the most popular websites (Appendix F of the CMA report, 2020, p. 
F13). This is not matched by any other platform: Facebook has the second highest 
prevalence of tags, and it covers between 40-50% of the most popular websites.  
• Moreover, Google combines all these data from many different sources to build a 
detailed super profile of each consumer, with the exclusion of services for which 
Google is a ‘data processor’ or otherwise restricted from merging data for ads (eg 
Google analytics). In particular, the availability of log-in data allows Google to identify 
all the computers and mobile devices associated with a user, associating all the data 
about the user to a single user ID. (CMA, 2020, p. 282).  
We close this subsection by reviewing Google’s leverage of its dominance in web browser 
market. Google Chrome has a market share of approximately 60% in Europe, in part due to 
being preinstalled on Android devices.12 Google can use its dominance in the browser market 
to impose changes that adversely affect rival ad intermediaries, such as blocking of third party 
cookies and proposing new standards such as "trust tokens" and a "privacy sandbox". In 
January 2020, Google announced that it would phase out third party cookies in its Chrome 
                                                          




browser. 13  Thanks to its greater knowledge about users relative to competing ad 
intermediaries, blocking third-party cookies would benefit Google vis-à-vis rival 
intermediaries. Google is active in developing web-standards to replace third-party cookies. 
Google could use Chrome's large market share to implement replacements for third party 
cookies which benefit its advertising services at the expense of others.  
5.4 Leveraging ad inventory 
Google leverages its YouTube ad inventory and search ad inventory to its ad tech stack. When 
Google initially purchased YouTube, its inventory was available for all DSPs to use. Then, in 
2015, Google closed YouTube and made it accessible only at its DSPs (CMA, 2020, p. 206). The 
value of advertising on its YouTube platform corresponds to 15-20% of the value of the entire 
open display advertising in the UK (Appendix M of the CMA report, 2020, p. M101-102). As 
advertisers use a single DSP for a given campaign in order to manage frequency, this tying 
induces any advertiser including YouTube in its campaign to use a Google’s DSP for the entire 
campaign.  
Google controls roughly 90% of search ad inventory and leverages its marker power in search 
ad inventory into display advertising by facilitating interoperability between its search ad 
service and its own DSP, Google Ads, which is the main route through which advertisers, 
especially smaller ones, buy Google’s search inventory. The importance of search inventory 
for advertisers makes Google Ads an extremely popular buying platform, with a very large 
advertiser base. Advertisers using Google Ads for their search campaigns can easily extend the 
scope of their campaigns to display advertising. Indeed, Google Ads includes both Search and 
Display Network by default when an advertiser sets up a campaign on Google Ads (Appendix 
M of the CMA report, 2020, p. M106). 
Given that most advertisers single-home for a given campaign, Google’s leverage of data and 
inventory significantly increases the market share of Google’s DSPs. 
5.5 Cross-subsidization 
A stand-alone ad intermediary which is not vertically integrated cannot charge fees below 
costs. By contrast, a vertically integrated ad intermediary, which is present at each layer of 
intermediaries, has an incentive to subsidize a layer to tip the market as it can recoup the loss 
with higher profits from other layers.  
Since the publisher side is the bottleneck side and publishers single-home on a publisher ad 
server, a publisher ad server plays a central role in ad intermediation: it is responsible for the 
decision logic that determines the choice of which advert will appear at each inventory. 
Following the acquisition of DoubleClick and its ad server in 2008, Google reduced the price 
of its publisher ad server by a factor of ten (Appendix M of the CMA report, 2020, p. M64). 
Such pricing pressure made the provision of publisher ad server difficult to sustain as  
                                                          
13 This followed Apple and Mozilla who also started to phase out third party cookies. 
18 
 
a standalone business. Google’s low pricing and aggressive marketing strategies led to the 
monopolization of the publisher ad server market: Google Ad Manager accounts for more than 
90% of the display ads served in the UK.  
As the complexity of the operations carried out by a publisher ad server gives it a degree of 
autonomy from publishers, Google can use monopoly power to impose changes to the rules 
publishers must follow in selling their own advertising.  
5.6 Latency 
Speed shapes competition among DSPs on ad exchanges. After an SSP sends bid requests, 
DSPs have a time limit of between 100 to160 milliseconds (one to two-tenths of a second) to 
submit their bids (Srinivasan, 2020, p. 15) and responses received after the time limit deadline 
are excluded from the auction.  
If Google operates both a SSP and a DSP, it can locate them close by geographically, reducing 
the time needed for information to travel between the two. Colocation can reduce the 
frequency of exclusion for the Google-owned DSPs from 1-in-4 to zero as latency issues can 
prevent advertisers from successfully submitting a bid up to 25% of bid requests (Srinivasan 
2020, p.34). Colocation provides Google-owned DSPs with a second benefit: they have more 
time to query additional data about the user to better determine the value of ad space for 
sale (Srinivasan 2020, p.34). By contrast, a rival DSP submitting a bid to the Google SSP suffers 
from double handicaps: latency from the lack of colocation and latency from cookie syncing. 
5.7 Further Strengthening Indirect Network Effects  
through Self-preferencing 
Note first that self-preferencing can be both exclusionary practices (presented in this section) 
and exploitative practices (presented in Section 7). We have seen that Google publisher ad 
server has above 90% market share in the UK. We have also seen that hashing consumer IDs, 
leveraging data, inventory and speed advantage gave an enormous advantage to Google’s 
DSPs. By engaging in self-preferencing, Google further reduces interoperability, strengthens 
indirect network effects and channels its buyer side market power to the supply side and vice 
versa. 
• Google can channel its DSPs’ demand to its SSP (AdX) by engaging in self-preferencing. 
A lot of the demand from Google’s DSPs, particularly from Google Ads, is channelled 
through AdX. For example, between September 2018 and August 2019, the aggregate 
value of the impressions won by Google Ads through AdX was several times that of 
impressions won through other third-party exchanges. (Appendix M of the CMA report 
2020, p. M108). Note however that it is hard to figure out how much of such demand 
channelling is due to self-preferencing as sharing common user IDs and lack of latency 
give advantage to Google-owned DSPs when submitting bids to AdX. 
• Google limits access of third-party publisher ad servers to AdX and can thereby 
leverage its market power on the demand side (channeled to its SSP) to its own 
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publisher ad servers. As AdX does not participate in header-bidding (see description in 
next point), AdX demand cannot be easily placed in real-time competition with that 
from other SSPs.  
• Google’s publisher ad server can self-preference its SSP by conferring the last look 
advantage. Google’s publisher ad server, formerly DoubleClick for Publishers (DFP), 
used Dynamic Allocation under which Google’s exchange AdX was the only SSP able to 
insert its real-time demand within DFP. Under Dynamic Allocation, DFP established a 
‘floor price’ based on estimated bids of non-Google SSPs and then sent a bid request 
to its own exchange (AdX). Estimated bids represent the bids DFP expected them to 
submit once called and were based on the average past performance of each SSP. AdX 
would run its real-time auction and secure the impression if it could submit a bid above 
the price floor while all other SSPs were stuck with their estimated bids. From 2015, a 
new technology, called header bidding, began to be used by publishers to allow all SSP 
partners the chance to compete against each other on the basis of their real-time 
demand. Google, however, decided not to participate in header bidding. This decision, 
combined with the working of Dynamic Allocation, resulted in AdX maintaining an 
advantage, called ‘last look’ advantage, over other SSPs where ads are delivered 
through DFP. When an impression is available, the user’s browser first calls the 
publisher’s SSP partners, which submit their bids to the header bidding auction. The 
browser then contacts DFP, which then sends a bid request to AdX with its price floor 
equal to the highest bid from the header bidding auction. As a response to header 
bidding, Google introduced Exchange Bidding, later renamed Open Bidding, a unified 
auction run by DFP where AdX competes in real-time with third-party ad exchanges, 










                                                          
14 In 2019, Google transitioned to a Unified first-price auction, where its publisher ad server now runs a single auction between the 
following demand: DSPs connecting to AdX, third-party ad exchanges participating in Open Bidding, direct deals and the winner header 
bidding bid. The move to unified auction in which Google both runs the auction and participates in it, provides Google with vast bidding 
data from its rivals and opportunities to favour its own exchange (Lechardoy et al., 2020). 
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6 Lack of transparency in display ad intermediation 
The lack of transparency is particularly severe in the open display advertising market where 
publishers and advertisers rely on a vertical chain of third-party intermediaries to manage the 
process of real-time bidding and ad serving but cannot observe directly what the 
intermediaries are doing or, in some cases, how much they are being charged. Note that the 
complexity of running real-time auctions and the fragmentation of ad intermediation also 
contribute to the lack of transparency. We can distinguish three kinds of transparency issues. 
6.1 Transparency of fees 
Market participants typically do not have visibility of the fees charged along the entire 
intermediation chain and many are concerned that this limits their ability to make optimal 
choices on how to buy or to sell inventory, reducing competition among intermediaries. 
Publishers have visibility on the commissions contractually agreed with SSPs but do not 
observe the fees DSPs (and other providers along the intermediation chain) charge to 
advertisers buying their inventory. It may be difficult for publishers even to know which 
advertisers are bidding for their inventory since SSPs rarely provide auction level data to 
publishers. This lack of transparency about the identity of the bidders and intermediaries’ fees 
may therefore limit publishers’ ability to negotiate directly with advertisers. This limits the 
competitive pressure faced by DSPs as direct deals are an alternative to selling inventory 
through intermediaries (CMA, 2020, p. 298). 
Symmetrically, advertisers can have transparency on the fees for the DSP part of the chain but 
not on the fees levied by SSPs. Given that publishers decide which ad should be served based 
on bids net of SSP fees, visibility of these fees could make it easier for advertisers to select the 
cheapest path to secure specific inventory. Hence, this lack of transparency may result in 
reduced competition between SSPs in attracting advertisers (CMA, 2020, p. 298). 
6.2 Transparency related to auction rules and algorithm  
Programmatic advertising is also considered opaque for the little auditable information 
available on the algorithms used and the quality of the matching process. The reliance on black 
box decision making makes it difficult for market participants to understand or challenge the 
decisions made, in particular how auctions are carried out and auction outcomes determined 
(Lechardoy et al., 2020). 
Many small publishers rely on automated bidding service of Google Ads, which has the 
potential to substantially improve advertising performance on behalf of advertisers. However, 
automated bidding is a ‘black box’ as the algorithms can be highly complex, relying on machine 
learning processes and incorporating various informational signals that the advertiser does 
not have access to. This is further complicated by the fact that Google carry out automated 
bidding on behalf of multiple advertisers competing in the same auctions. (Appendix Q of the 
CMA report, 2020, p. Q7). 
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6.3 Transparency related to ad verification and attribution 
To make informed choices that can drive competition, advertisers need to be able to assess 
and evaluate the quality of the product they are purchasing. Two important elements of this 
process are:  
• verification: checking the viewability of the advert and the context in which it was 
displayed, including identifying potential ad fraud; and  
• attribution: tracking what actions the consumer took after being exposed to the advert.  
Although both Google and Facebook work with a number of approved third-party verification 
providers, they restrict access to the detailed data in respect of verification for their owned-
and-operated advertising inventory. Without access to the underlying raw data and the ability 
to have full independent verification, advertisers and media agencies have the perception that 
Google and Facebook have the freedom, in effect, to ‘mark their own homework’ (CMA, 2020, 
p. 410). This generates an incentive for them to overreport. For example, in September 2016, 
Facebook acknowledged that it had overreported the average ‘watch time’ metric for videos. 
It was reported that the extent of the overstatement was estimated to be between 60-80% 
for around two years (Appendix O of the CMA report, 2020, p. O12).15 
There are also concerns about ad fraud. ‘Ad fraud’ refers to the fraud committed in the 
delivery of advertising and includes a range of practices used to misrepresent advertising 
impressions, clicks or conversions. The result is that advertisers are charged for advertising 
that does not actually reach their intended audience. Ad fraud is more prevalent in open 
display advertising. According to the World Federation of Advertisers (WFA, 2016), ad fraud 
will grow globally up to between 10% and 30% of the digital ad spend by 2025, oscillating 
between USD 50-140 billion (EUR 44.7-127 billion).  According to the WFA (2016), when there 
is ad fraud, the 40 percent of what is paid by advertisers goes to the perpetrator whereas the 
remaining 60% to the ad intermediation industry. As the ad intermediation industry is the main 
beneficiary of ad fraud, its incentive to combat ad fraud can be weak. 
'Walled garden' platforms can track users across different devices and sessions, enabling them 
to attribute consumers' actions more accurately than third parties. Some actions of the large 
platforms have made third party attribution more difficult. For example, in 2018 Google made 
the decision to prevent DoubleClick user IDs being accessed by ad buyers. This made it more 
difficult to compare ad performance between ads purchased through the Google ad tech stack 
and ads purchased through other intermediaries. This change has also made independent 
attribution (ie attribution using tools other than Google products such as Google Ads Data Hub 
or Google Analytics360) much more difficult (CMA, 2020, p. 302).  
  
                                                          




7 Google’s exploitation of its market power  
and the lack of transparency 
Google has strong market power at each layer of ad intermediation and therefore is subject 
to conflicts of interest. The lack of transparency in ad intermediation exacerbates this conflict 
of interest and induces it to engage in exploitative behaviours such as self-preferencing 
(Section 5.7). There is neither regulation nor public oversight of Google’s conflicts of interest.  
This point was raised by Congresswoman Jayapal at the Antitrust Subcommittee's sixth 
hearing in 2020 when questioning Google CEO Sundar Pichai: “So Google is running the 
marketplace, it's acting on the buy side, and it's acting on the sell side at the same time, which 
is a major conflict of interest. It allows you to set rates very low as a buyer of ad space from 
newspapers, depriving them of their ad revenue, and then also to sell high to small businesses 
who are very dependent on advertising on your platform. It sounds a bit like a stock market, 
except unlike a stock market, there's no regulation on your ad exchange market” (US House of 
Representatives 2020, p.207) 
7.1 Arbitrage between two sequential auctions of an impression 
This arbitrage is exactly what Congresswoman Jayapal was referring to in the above quote and 
takes place in the context of sequential auctions to sell an impression. Then, lack of 
transparency may induce an intermediary (SSP or DSP) to engage in an arbitrage by buying an 
impression at one price and selling it at a higher one without its customers being aware of the 
magnitude of the difference. Some evidence of arbitrage is provided by a study of PwC on 
behalf of ISBA (2020). The study was unable to attribute 15% of advertisers’ spend 
(corresponding to approximately 30% of the difference between advertisers’ spend and 
publishers’ revenues for matched impressions) as in many cases the winning bid recorded by 
the DSP did not match the gross revenue recorded by the SSP. According to the CMA (2020), 
the difference between the CMA’s estimation of ad tech take and the estimation by PwC is 
almost entirely explained by this so-called ‘unknown delta’. The result suggests that ‘hidden 
fees’ might account for a significant fraction of the cost of intermediation. 
The ability and incentive to engage in such arbitrage are very strong for Google for various 
reasons. It is dominant at each layer of ad intermediation. When a Google-owned DSP makes 
a bid into a Google-owned SSP, it enjoys a number of advantages relative to competing DSPs 
such as a larger number of advertisers, a larger amount of high-quality data for targeting, data 
interoperability from sharing common consumer IDs, lack of latency etc. Therefore, it is very 
likely that the winning bid from the Google-owned DSP will win the auction in the Google-
owned SSP and hence Google has a strong incentive to engage in the arbitrage. 
The conflict of interest is particularly strong in the case of automated bidding service, which 
most small publishers using Google Ads rely on. As Google Ads’ demand is typically channelled 
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to Google’s SSP (AdX), Google has an incentive to raise prices paid by advertisers to profit from 
the arbitrage.   
7.2 Arbitrage across different impressions of the same consumer 
due to data leakage 
If the previous arbitrage occurs for a given impression, this second type of arbitrage occurs 
across impressions on different websites visited by a given consumer. There is a concern that 
access by DSPs to browsing data from publisher sites may undermine the value of that data to 
the publishers themselves through the previously mentioned ‘data leakage’. DSPs generally 
obtain permission from publishers to place tracking cookies on their websites, so that they 
can observe user browsing behaviour. User browsing data is pooled by DSPs with other data 
about the same user from various sources to generate a rich user profile for personalised ad 
targeting. These profiles are used by DSPs for targeting ads to a user across multiple publisher 
websites and apps. For instance, DMG Media stated, ‘it is still of concern that our loyal and 
highly scaled audience, built through significant effort and investment, may be utilized to help 
power ad campaigns across low quality arbitrage websites’. (Appendix M of the CMA report, 
2020, p. 78) 
Among all ad intermediaries, Google has the strongest ability and incentive to engage in this 
type of arbitrage. First, the amount of browsing data it collects from third-party publishers is 
by far the largest because of its monopolistic position in the publisher ad server market. 
Second, the availability of log-in data allows Google to identify all the computers and mobile 
devices associated with a user, associating all the data about the user to a single user ID. Third, 
Google owns a large amount of ad inventories and manages almost all ad inventories of third-
party publishers through its ad server. In fact, Google is subject to another kind of conflict of 
interest which arises because it is vertically integrated into consumer-facing products: it has a 
strong incentive to show highly valuable ads on Google-owned sites since then it obtains the 
totality of what is paid by advertisers. 
Note that data leakage is not limited to the individuals whose data are collected by Google: 
Google can find doppelgangers16 of the individuals (i.e. those whose profiles are very similar 
to the individuals) and show them the same ad.   
7.3 Using its search dominance to impose standards like Accelerated 
Mobile Pages (AMP) to deprive publishers of user data 
The AMP issue is raised both in the CMA (2020) report and the report of U.S. House of 
Representatives (2020). The AMP standard allows fast loading of articles in mobile 
environment. However, Google induces (or coerces) publishers to adopt the AMP by giving 
AMP articles prominent positions in its mobile search result pages. For instance, only news 
articles meeting the AMP standard can appear in “Top Stories” carousel, which attracts a 
                                                          
16 Stephens-Davidowitz (2017) 
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majority of users’ attention. In addition, Google displays a “lightning” icon besides the link for 
AMP articles, to indicate that their pages can be loaded fast.  
There are two main concerns related to the AMP. First, AMP articles are cached by Google 
and hence Google can collect data on consumer’s browsing activities on AMP articles. (See 
Appendix S of the CMA Report 2020, p. 3 and p. 17).17 This also explains why AMP articles load 
fast. Second, the AMP standard restricts the use of JavaScript, which is precisely the code that 
publishers need to use to make work the (client-side) header bidding, which is a popular 
technology allowing a publisher to enable several SSPs to compete on real-time basis 


















                                                          




8 Some reflections on how to build  
a level-playing field in ad intermediation 
Even if proposing remedies is beyond the scope of this report, the analysis of the report 
provides us with elements for reflections on how to restore competition in the ad 
intermediation market. 
Among various strategies used by Google, the report has highlighted Google’s use of consumer 
privacy to strengthen its market power: Google hashed user IDs for privacy protection and 
justified the reversal of its commitment not to combine data by consumer consent. It is 
therefore important to tackle the question of to what extent there is any trade-off between 
consumer privacy and competition in the digital advertising market. For instance, to what 
extent has the GDPR helped Google and Facebook entrench their market power in the digital 
advertising market?  
To create a level-playing field in which a stand-alone intermediary without scale can freely 
enter and compete on the merit of its service, it is imperative to restore interoperability. 
Restoring data interoperability may require introducing common consumer IDs across all ad 
intermediaries. Encouraging adoption of common standards would increase technical 
interoperability. If there is no level-playing field and hence ad intermediation involves high ad 
tech takes, consumers are harmed because publishers may invest much less in content and 
advertisers may pass-through to consumers high ad intermediation fees. 
The analysis of the report also suggests that it could be appropriate to evaluate the need for 
a possible public intervention as regards the current data practices in the open display ad 
market both from a static and a dynamic point of view.  Currently, Google collects browsing 
data from almost all third-party publishers and combines it with data from Google-owned 
products (including Google search) in order to create super profiles of consumers for ad 
targeting. Does such unlimited data combination maximize static efficiency and dynamic 
efficiency? Regarding static efficiency, maximal data combination may generate efficiency by 
improving matching between publishers’ ad inventories and advertisers. However, how an 
increase in ad targeting affects consumer surplus is a largely open question. In particular, there 
is an increasing concern about platforms’ manipulations of consumer behaviour: when a 
platform knows much better about a consumer than the consumer knows about herself, the 
platform can manipulate the consumer’s behaviour by exploiting vulnerabilities in her 
psychology (Calo, 2014). The concern is stronger for advertising-financed platforms such as 
Google and social media (Zuboff, 2019, and Rosenquist, Scott Morton and Weinstein, 2020).  
The dynamic efficiency concern in terms of publishers’ incentive to invest in content can 
induce public authorities to think about ways to restore publishers’ control of data with 
respect to ad intermediaries, as it was the norm at the time of the Google-DoubleClick merger. 
Publishers’ data are fruits of their investment in content. As long as consumer privacy is 
respected, publishers should be able to exercise full control over their data. Data leakage, 
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through free-riding of Google and other intermediaries, may significantly undermine their 
incentives to invest in content. Given that Google has monopoly power in the publisher ad 
server market, Google can impose its terms and conditions on publishers to facilitate its 
collection and combination of publishers’ data. Therefore, one could reflect on the possibility 
of regulatory intervention to remedy this asymmetry in bargaining power. Public authorities 
can consider data separation or data silos in order to limit Google’s ability to combine 
publishers’ data for ad arbitrage. As a single publisher may not have enough scale and scope 
of data for ad targeting, policy makers can consider encouraging a collective action of 
publishers to form a coalition which pools their data for targeting but prohibits Google and 
other intermediaries from combining their data with other data in order to limit data leakage. 
Note that limiting data leakage should help better preserve consumer privacy than letting data 
leakage happen. 
Although publishers and advertisers share a common interest in creating a level-playing field 
to make ad intermediation more competitive, they may have conflicting interests regarding 
data combination: advertisers may like maximal data combination as this facilitates ad 
targeting and lowers advertising prices by expanding supply of ad inventory for targeting. 
However, combining all available data to build super profiles of consumers may reduce 
publishers’ incentive to invest in content.18 It is desirable to conduct research on optimal 
scope of data combination by ad intermediaries.  
Public authorities can also introduce measures regarding Google’s leverage of data and 
inventory: they may consider mandatory data sharing and data silos and force Google to make 
YouTube inventory available on rival DSPs. 
In order to eliminate Google’s conflicts of interest in ad intermediation, one could also draw  
inspiration  from  the regulation of electronic financial trading market (Srinivasan, 2020) and 
reflect on the need for  guidelines and oversight against conflicts of interest. As a last resort, 
if all such steps failed, more structural measures ranging from operational separation to full 
ownership separation could be considered. 
To make the open display advertising market more transparent, public authorities can 
consider encouraging greater provision of transaction data together with introduction of 
common transaction ID and enabling independent verification within walled gardens. 
Regarding the AMP standard, measures could be envisaged to ensure that, instead of 
imposing the standard, Google treats in a non-discriminatory way, in its search results, all 
articles that meet an objective and neutral performance criterion of loading speed. It should 
also be considered whether restrictions should be put in place regarding the collection and/or 
use of browsing data due to the caching of AMP articles. 
As a final word, it needs to be emphasized that online advertising has come to represent a 
core element of complex ecosystems, in which any change can have far-reaching societal 
                                                          
18 Even from a static point of view, maximizing data combination may harm consumers as this facilitates platforms’ 
manipulations of consumer behavior by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in consumer psychology (Calo, 2014) 
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consequences beyond what is intended when the change is put in place. Therefore, without 
prejudice to the limitations of the restricted scope of this case study, public oversight and 
interventions in platforms’ advertising practices could appear justified based on all the issues 
identified in this report. Given, however, the constantly evolving features and functioning of 
the ecosystems involved, the design and calibration of any public measure which would be 
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